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INTRODUCTION 
1 
"A11 men are created equal". This famous statement is part 
of one of the doctrines that constitute the foundation of democracy 
in the United States. The interpretation of this statement in a 
democracy does not permit any discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, or previous servitude. It calls for equal rights before 
the law and equal opportunities in employment and education. 
In the development of America's institutions two basic prin-
ciples concerning education and integration emerged. First, education 
was a state function and public schools would be provided for all who 
wished to attend. Second, every citizen regardless of race, color, 
or creed should have the opportunity to attend such schools. 
Since World War II there has been a renewed interest in the 
public schools and in integration as two of the fundamental ways of 
preserving democracy in the United States. Although the majority of 
the people in the United States have accepted this theory, this did 
not negate the problem of conditions that existed in making such 
opportunities available. 
Many cases have been appealed to the United States Supreme Court 
in an effort to obtain a legal decision on integration-segregation in 
public schools. Two such cases stood out as milestones in this dispute 
and have had a greater effect than all the other cases put together. 
1 
Samuel Morison and Henry Commager. The Growth of the American 
Republic. New York; Oxford University Press, 1951, p. 196. 
2 
These two cases were: 
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896 
2 . Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954 and 1955 
Statement of the Problem. The purpose of this study was (1) 
to examine the United States Supreme Court cases of 1896 and 1956-55 
dealing with the integration-segregation problem in the public schools; 
(2) to analyze the opinions of the different justices on the cases; (3) 
to consider the interpretations of the decisions of the Court by various 
authorities; and (4) to determine the implications of these decisions. 
Significance of the Problem. The legal basis for the integration-
segregation cases appealed to the United States Supreme Court was the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This amendment 
stated: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.2 
The main interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has been that 
all persons born or naturalized in the United States were citizens of the 
United States regardless of their c o l o r , religion, o r creed. Thus, a 
Negro meeting these qualifications was as much a citizen as was a white 
2 
Mrs. John L. Buel. D.A.R. Manual for Citizenship. Washington: 
D . C . : Judd and Detweiler, Inc. , 1960, p. 104 
3 
man with the same qualifications. Furthermore, no state was to pass 
laws which would deprive certain citizens of their rights. A state 
law designed to discriminate against a certain portion of its popula-
tion would be unconstitutional because it would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. No state could deprive 
a citizen of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, 
which included the right of a person to be informed of the charges 
made against him and the right for legal counsel and a jury trial. All 
citizens regardless of race, religion, or creed were equal before the 
law and had. equal rights and obligations. 
The United States Supreme Court clearly deliniated the issue 
when it stated: 
We must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the 
nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in 
public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection 
of the laws. The question is: Does segregation of children in 
public schools, solely on the basis of race, even though the 
physical facilities and other tangible factors may be equal, de-
prive the children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities 
Limitations of the study. The study was limited to an analysis 
of two pertinent cases which have been adjudicated before the United 
States Supreme Court. These cases were: 
1 . Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896 
2 . Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954 and 1955 
The two cases dealt with the same subject, segregation-integration in 
3 
Virgil Clift. Negro Education in America. New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1962, p. 112. 
public schools, but the interpretations handed down by the Supreme 
Court -were different. The cases will be introduced in the above 
mentioned order. 
The study was also limited to the segregation-integration prob-
lem of the Negro race. 
Definition of Terms. Segregation - as used in this study means 
the separation or isolation of a race, class, or ethnic group by en-
forced divided educational facilities and other discriminatory means. 
Integration - as used in this study means the incorporation 
into society or an organization (such as a public school) on the basis 
of common and equal membership of individuals differing in some group 
characteristic (such as race). 
Procedures. The procedures used in making this study were: 
1 . An examination of the texts of the selected cases 
2 . A survey of the literature available in the Kansas State Uni-
versity Library concerning the problem of integration-segre-
gation in public schools with special emphasis on the selected 
cases. 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SEGREGATED PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Negro has been a part of the American scene from the time 
the nation was discovered. Negroes were part of the crews of Spanish 
and Portuguese explorers who came to the New World and explored its 
vast reaches. However, people were not concerned with the education 
4 
5 
4 
of the Negro in these early days. The story of the American education 
of the Negro began with the African slave trade. This slave trade was 
opened formally in 1517 when Bishop Las Casas advocated the encourage-
ment of immigration to the New World by permitting Spaniards to import 
twelve slaves each. The development and exploitation of vast resources 
found 
in the New World made cheap labor a necessity. Soon it was found 
that Negroes were much abler to do the work that had to be done than 
were the American Indians. Consequently, the slave trade flourished 
and. a seemingly inexhaustible supply of slaves flowed into America. 
During the colonial period, the institution of slavery was recog-
nized as being incompatible with ideas of education. It was felt that 
the education of the Negro slave would bring about the end of slavery 
because educated slaves would soon realize the gross inequality and in-
justice that had been pressed upon them. Thus, the Negro was taken 
away from his African homeland and culture, but was not acknowledged as 
an American. The Negro was in somewhat of a no-man's-land. 
Not all people in America during the colonial period agreed with 
the view that slavery and education were incompatible. Certain organi-
zations and individuals felt an obligation and duty to help the Negro 
slaves and educate them. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
in Foreign Parts, for example, urged the slave holders to educate their 
4 
William Brickman. A Countdown on Segregation of Education. 
New York: Society for Advancement of Education, 1960, p. 14. 
5 
Morison and Commager, op.cit. , p. 311 
6 
6 
slaves. When the majority of the slave holders refused the Society 
took it upon themselves to educate the Negro slaves. The Society 
taught some slaves to read, write, and study the Scripture. The Quakers 
of Pennsylvania were another group that tried to improve the conditions 
7 
amongst the slaves. They, too, tried to educate the Negro slaves and 
even started working toward the abolishment of slavery which at that 
time was considered an unthinkable thing. 
In the New England states Negroes benefited from the intellectual 
activities that had taken place around 1700. Some outstanding educators 
of the time started educating Negroes as well as whites. John Elliot, 8 
for example, took time out from his busy schedule to instruct Negroes. 
9 
Cotton Mather started an evening school for Indians and Negroes in 1717. 
Consequently, the New England Negro was the best trained of all Negroes 
in the New World. Despite this more advanced stage of learning that the 
New England Negro received, Dr. Lorenzo Green, an authority on the Negro 
in this section of the country, asserted that "most of the Negroes in the 
New England as in other colonies were still infidels at the end of the 
10 
colonial period". 
The French and Spanish settlers were more active in trying to 
educate slaves because of their concern for indoctrinating them with 
6 
Ibid, p. 313 
7 
Ibid, p. 317 
8 
Clift, op.cit. , p. 22 
9 
Ibid, p. 24 
10 
Ibid, p. 25 
7 
Christianity. Now the question arose: Could a country have Christianity 
and slavery at the same time? Did not Christian theory hold that all 
men were equal in the sight of God and brothers under His fatherhood? 
Thus, Christianity and slavery were incompatible. On the other hand, 
however, merchants desired to continue their lucrative profits from the 
slave trade and slave owners were reluctant to give up their property. 
So most religious groups in America sanctioned slavery while at the 
same time they endorsed and professed Christianity. 
The influence of Anthony Benezet in the education of Negroes was 
significant. He began an evening school for Negroes in his home in 
Philadelphia in 1750 and continued instruction of Negroes there for 
11 
twenty years. He was greatly opposed to the accepted idea of his 
time that Negroes were inferior in their learning capacity and that 
educating these inferior people was a waste of time. Benezet stated: 
I can with truth and sincerity declare that I have found 
amongst the Negroes as great a variety of talents as amongst a 
like number of whites; and I am bold to assert, that the notion 
entertained by some, that the blacks are inferior in their capa-
cities, is a vulgar prejudice, founded on the pride or ignorance 
of their lordly masters, who kept their slaves at such a distance, 
as to be unable to form a right judgement of them. 1 2 
During the American Evolution the doctrine of the natural rights 
of man was established. The opponents of slavery used this doctrine to 
demand education of the Negroes for citizenship. Not everyone agreed. 
Jefferson, for example, thought that Negroes should be given industrial 
11 
George S. Brooks. Friend Anthony Benezet. Philadelphia; 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937, p.46 
12 
Ibid, pp. 47-48 
8 
and agricultural education, but did. not believe in the intellectual 
equality of Negro and white and therefore did not envision the in-
13 
corporation of the Negro into the white community. Benjamin Franklin, 
on the other hand, favored and encouraged the full education of the 
Negro. 
Between the time of the American Revolution and the Civil War 
little progress was made in educating the Negroes in large numbers. 
Amos Dresser carried out a study on the literacy rate of the Negro 
slaves during this period and found that one out of every fifty slaves 
14 
was able to read and write. In another study D. G. Parsons estimated 
that about 5,000 of Georgia's 400,000 slaves were literate and could at 
least read and write to a certain extent. Some isolated slave owners 
took it upon themselves to educate their Negro slaves because they felt 
that an educated slave was more valuable and would bring a higher price 
than an illiterate slave. In some instances Negroes attended mixed 
schools in the South during this period. In1840 , for example, Negroes 
were permitted, to attend schools with white children in Wilmington, 
16 
Delaware. These instances were isolated and few in numbers, however. 
The Negro in the North again benefited more than the Southern Negro 
13 
Ina Brown. Race Relations in a Democracy. New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1949, p. 37 
14 
Brickman, op.cit. , p. 26 
15 
Ibid, p. 27 
16 
Harry Ashmore. The Negro and the Schools. Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1954, p.81 
9 
from the general trend to establish and improve schools after the Ameri-
can Revolution. Separate schools for Negroes were established in many 
Northern cities. One of the best known Negro schools during this period 
was the New York African Free School which began with forty students in 
17 
1787 and had an enrollment of 500 by 1820. 
In 1849 a case was brought before the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
contesting segregated schools. The case was called Roberts v. City of 18 
Boston. Charles Sumner argued against separate schools on behalf of a 
Negro girl who had been barred from a white school under the local 
ordinance providing for separate education of the races. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court held against Sumner and the plaintiff and upheld the separate 
school ordinance. However, by 1855 sufficient public opinion had been 
mobilized on the issue to persuade the Massachusetts Legislature to re-
pudiate the Court's decision and in fact prohibit separate education of 
the races. 
After the Civil War and during Reconstruction, education for the 
Negro took on a new course. The first great program of organized education 
for the Negro was established. Negro schools increased and were paid for 
by taxes. The southerner, with regard to Negro education, may be divided 
into three groups: (1) The Conservatives who attempted to reinstate as 
far as possible the servil status of the Negro. This group was opposed 
to any form of education of the Negro. (2) The Moderates who realized 
17 
Ibid, p. 83 
18 
Brickman, op.cit., p. 27 
lO 
that slavery was dead and that the new status of the Negro should be 
recognized in creating a new society in the South. This group favored 
a limited amount of education for the Negro. (3) The Radicals who had 
no real interest in the slave system and thus were in favor of all-out 
education of the Negro. The majority of the southern whites accepted 
the moderate view as long as the education of the Negro would take place 
19 
in segregated facilities. Furthermore, no one had made any rules 
concerning the extent and quality of education that the Negroes were to 
receive and therefore it was up to the southerners to give as good or 
as marginal an education to the Negroes as they wanted. The idea of 
Negro intellectual inferiority was brought up again in the South. A 
Virginian, under the penname of "Civis", wrote: 
I oppose public education because its policy is cruelty to 
the Negro himself. It instills in his mind that he is competent 
to share in the higher walks of life, prompts him to despise those 
menial pursuits to which his race has been doomed, and invites him 
to enter into competition with the white man for those tempting 
prizes that can be won only by a quicker and profounder sagacity, 
by a greater energy and self denial, and a higher order of administra-
tive talent than the Negro has ever developed. 
The chief result of the Reconstruction government concerning the education 
of the South was the establishment of public tax supported education for 
the masses as a democratic right to which citizens were entitled. This 
included the education of the Negro financed by public taxes. 
In 1896 the famous case of Plessy v. Ferguson was brought before 
19 
Brickman, op.cit., p. 30 
20 
Helen Fuller. "The Defiant Ones in Virginia". The New Republic, 
Jan. 12, 1959, pp. 9-10 
11 
the United States Supreme Court. The ruling of the Court was that 
21 
"separate but equal" education was perfectly alright. The Court 
stated that "segregation in education was a general American practice, 
22 
not a uniquely Southern one". Thus, the Court firmly embedded the 
durable doctrine of "separate but equal" and caused the perpetuation 
and strengthening of the dual school system. This doctrine was a great 
setback to the cause of Negro education and was used by the segre-
gationists until the handing down of the 1954 United States Supreme 
Court decision. 
The leader and spokesman of the Negroes around the turn of the 
century was Booker T. Washington. When the southerners offered a 
compromise to the Negroes in which the Negroes were supposed to remain 
politically inarticulate and disfranchised in return for a modicum of 
education, Washington accepted. This came to be known as the "Atlanta 
23 
Compromise". Washington felt that it was time to be pragmatic and 
realistic rather than emotional. He concluded that a program of co-
operation with the white, even if it did not bring all the Negro's wants 
and rights with it , was likely to bring the Negro highest utilitarian 
21 
Lawrence Evans. Cases on American Constitutional Law. 
Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1957, p.921 
22 
Ibid, p. 922 
23 
Charles Johnson. Patterns of Negro Segregation. New York; 
Harper & Brothers, 1943, p.171 
12 
success and greatest personal safety and security. Washington felt 
that the question of social equality of the Negro at this time was an 
extremist folly. He advised the Negroes to "cast down your buckets 
24 
where you are" and educate the "head, hand, and heart". 
The southern white hailed the Compromise as a platform upon 
which blacks and whites could stand with full justice to each other. 
However, not all Negroes accepted Booker T. Washington's advice. Some 
felt that he had sold them out. W. DuBois, a Negro scholar, led the 
opposing forces. He denounced the Compromise and insisted that all 
free Negroes were entitled to every right and privilege of any other 
American. DuBois stated his views in a speech at Atlanta in 1906; 
We want full manhood suffrage, and we want it now, henceforth 
and forever. Second: We want discrimination in public accommo-
dations to cease. Third; We claim the right of free men to walk, 
talk, and be with them who wish to be with us. Fourth: We want 
our children educated. And we call for education meaning real 
education. We believe in work. We ourselves are workers but 
work is not necessarily education. Education is the development 
of power and ideal. 25 
The twentieth century saw an increase in Negro activities in 
their fight for equality and educational opportunity. Negroes soon 
realized that strength corresponded to numbers and that an isolated 
individual could accomplish very little. Groups such as the "National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored people" and the "Congress 
26 
For Racial Equality" emerged. These groups started organized attacks 
24 
Ibid, p. 173 
25 
Lilian Smith. Now is the Time. New York: Viking, 1955, p.211 
26 
"Integration without Turmoil". Look, April, 1960, p. 55 
13 
on discrimination measures with such tactics as sit-ins and picketing. 
The United States Supreme Court handed down decisions ordering several 
universities to admit Negro students to their graduate schools. This 
did not invalidate the "separate but equal" doctrine, however. More 
and more public schools opened their doors to Negroes on an integrated 
basis. The gap between the education received by the white and that 
received by the Negro was made narrower between 194O and 1950. The 
following chart illustrated this point: 
Year White Negro 
1 . Current expenditures per 1940 100% 
42% 
1950 100% 70% 
2. Capital Outlay per pupil 1940 100% 23% 
1950 100% 82% 
3. Salaries of teachers 1940 100% 55% 
1950 100% 85% 
4. Training of teachers 1940 100% 75% 
1950 100% 95% 
5. Length of school year 1940 100% 95% 
1950 100% 100% 
6. Number of school library 1940 100% 25% 
books 1950 100% 
40% 
27 
However, in the 1950's there were still thirteen southern states that 
had either complete or partial segregation. These thirteen states were 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
27 
Don Shoemaker. With All Deliberate Speed. New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1957, p. 221 
14 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
28 
Virginia. 
In 1954 the most important case in the battle against segregation 
was ruled upon by the United States Supreme Court. It was the case of 
29 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. The United States Supreme Court 
explicitly overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine of the Plessy 
case and ruled unanimously that segregation of the races in public edu-
cation was unconstitutional. Some states and school districts complied 
with the decision promptly and integrated. Others put up a fight and 
only complied after violence had erupted and order had to be restored 
by the Federal Government. Still other places put up a fight and adopted 30 
measures designed to circumvent the ruling. 
Negroes continued, to contest segregation in states that failed to 
obey the 1954 United States Supreme Court decision. In 1955 the case of 
Lucy et al. v. Adams was brought before the United States Supreme Court. 
The Court ordered the University of Alabama to admit Miss Lucy, a Negro, 
to the University as a student. In 1958 the case of Cooper v. Aaron was 
brought before the United States Supreme Court. In this case the Court 
denied the Little Rock, Arkansas, high schools a petition requesting 
the right to delay the start of integration for two and one half years. 
28 
Albert Blaustein. Desegregation and the Law. New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1957, p. 71 
29 
Ibid, p. 127 
30 
Fuller, op.cit., p. 12 
15 
SEPARATE BUT EQUAL EDUCATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
In 1890 the Legislature of Louisiana passed an act requiring all 
railway companies carrying passengers in that state to provide "equal 
but separate" accommodations for the white and colored races and that 
"no person or persons shall be admitted to occupy seats in coaches other 
31 
than the ones assigned to them on account of the race they belong to". 
Any violator of this statute was subject to a fine. Homer Adolph Plessy 
was a citizen of the United States, a resident of the State of Louisiana, 32 
and was by descent seven-eight Caucasian and one-eight African. On 
June 7, 1892, Plessy purchased a ticket on the East Louisiana Railway, 
entered a passenger train and took possession of a vacant seat in a coach 
where passengers of the white race were accommodated. The railway company 
was incorporated by the laws of Louisiana as a common carrier and there-
fore fell under the above mentioned statute which had been passed by the 
Louisiana Legislature concerning common carriers. The conductor asked 
Plessy to vacate the coach in which he was sitting and take a seat in 
the coach assigned, to people of the colored race. Plessy refused to 
comply and was forcibly ejected from his seat and carried to prison. 
Plessy was charged with violating the statute passed by the Louisiana 
Legislature requiring the separation of races on railway carriers. Plessy 
charged that the statute was unconstitutional because it was in violation 
31 
Evans, op.cit. , p. 1004. 
32 
Ibid 
16 
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and in-
voluntary servitude. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the states 
from making any laws which abridged the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States. The criminal court in New Orleans 
which heard the case upheld the statute passed by the State Legis-
lature and ruled against Plessy. John Ferguson was presiding over 
the New Orleans court. Plessy appealed to the Louisiana State Supreme 
Court. The State Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute in question and refused the relief sought by Plessy. Plessy 
again appealed and the case reached the United States Supreme Court. 
The majority and dissenting opinions of the United States 
Supreme Court 
Justice Henry Brown was the spokesman for the majority which in-
cluded Justices Melville Fuller, Stephen Field, Morace Gray, George 
Shiras, Edward White, and Rufus Peckham. Justice Brown felt that it 
was too clear for argument that the statute in question was not a vio-
lation of the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as 
Plessy had asserted. The Thirteenth Amendment, which dealt with slavery 
and involuntary servitude, could not be applied in this case because the 
Louisiana statute made no mention of reinstituting slavery and involun-
tary servitude. Justice Brown stated: 
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the 
white and colored, races - a distinction which is founded in the 
color of the two races, and which must always exist as long as 
white men are distinguished from the other race by color - has no 
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-
17 
33 
establish a state of involuntary servitude. 
Justice Brown referred back to and agreed with the statement made by 
Justice Bradley in a case of United States v. Stanley which dealt with 
the interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment and in which Justice 
Bradley stated; 
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to 
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may 
see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the 
people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his 
concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse 
or business. 34 
Plessy also claimed that a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution had taken place. Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment all persons born or naturalized in the United States were 
citizens of the United States and also of the state in which they re-
sided and fell under the jurisdiction of the United States. This Amend-
ment also held that no state could make or enforce laws which would ab-
ridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, 
nor could any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law. Furthermore, all citizens were equal before the 
35 
law. 
Justice Brown in speaking for the majority interpreted the Four-
teenth Amendment as follows; 
The object of the Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the 
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the 
nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distin-
Plessy v. Ferguson 163 US 543 (1896) 
3k 
Ibid 
35 
Blaustein, op.cit. , p. 171 
18 
guished from political equality, or a comingling of the two races 
upon terms unsatisfactory to either. ° 
Thus, the state legislature under its "police power" could pass laws 
requiring the separation of races at certain places or at certain times 
if they felt it necessary. This would not be a violation of the Federal 
Constitution because internal problems within each state came under the 
jurisdiction of the state legislature. Under the state's "police power" 
the state could make rules and laws designed to maintain order and in-
sure the citizens' safety. Justice Brown noted that all states made use 
of this "police power". The establishment of separate schools for white 
and colored children was a valid exercise of the legislative power of a 
state. Even in the states where the political rights of the colored 
race had earnestly been enforced, the courts had upheld the establish-
ment of separate facilities. Justice Brown made it evident that laws 
requiring or permitting segregation of the races in certain places did 
not imply the inferiority of either race. 
Justice Brown further clarified the majority opinion judges' 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by citing and agreeing with 
the statement made by Justice Shaw in the case of Roberts v. City of 
Boston. This was the earliest case which dealt with segregation. Justice 
Shaw made the following statements: 
The great principle advanced by the learned and eloquent advo-
cate of the plaintiff, Mr. Charles Sumner (who argued against segre-
gation) is , that by the Constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all 
persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin 
36 
Plessy v. Ferguson 163 US (1896), op.cit., p. 258 
19 
or condition, are equal before the law. But, when this great 
principle comes to be applied to the actual and various conditions 
of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion that men 
and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political 
powers and that children and adults are legally to have the same 
functions and be subject to the same treatment, but only that the 
rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are 
equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of 
the law for their maintenance and security. 37 
The United States Supreme Court drew a distinction between state laws 
interfering with the political equality of the Negro and those merely 
requiring the separation of the races in schools, theaters, and rail-
way carriages. Justice Brown cited the case of Strader v. West Virginia 
where the United States Supreme Court held that 
. . . . in the selection of jurors to pass upon the life, liberty, 
and property of a colored man, there shall be no exclusion of his 
race and no discrimination against them because of their color. 
Thus, Negroes could not be excluded from being jurors because of their 
color. However, state laws dealing with the separation of the races in 
schools, theaters, railways, and lunchcounters were considered part of 
the regulatory power of the individual state as was the establishment 
of separate schools for poor and neglected children. 
The United States Supreme Court also made a distinction between 
interstate and intrastate passenger traffic. Justice Brown cited the 
case of Hall v. DeCuir in which the United States Supreme Court held that 
. . . . passengers traveling among the states must have equal rights 
and privileges in all parts of the vessel with outer distinctions 
such as race or color being disregarded, and subjected to an action 
for damages, the owner of such a vessel who excluded colored passengers 
for no other reason than their previous condition of servitude and 
37 
Evans, op.cit., pp. 1005-6 
38 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US (1896), op.cit., p. 259 
20 
their color from the cabins set aside by him for the use of whites, 
it was held to be unconstitutional and void as far as it applied to 
interstate commerce. 39 
However, the United States Supreme Court in this case disclaimed that 
its ruling had anything whatever to do with the regulation of internal 
commerce not crossing state lines. Justice Brown, furthermore, cited 
the case of Louisville N .0 .& T Railroad v. Mississippi which dealt with 
a railway company solely involved in intrastate transportation. In 
this case the Supreme Court held that 
. . . . if it be a matter respecting commerce wholly within the 
state, and not interfering with commerce between the states, then, 
obviously, there is no violation of the commerce clause of the 
Federal Constitution. There is no question as to the power of the 
state to separate in different compartments intrastate passengers. 40 
Justice Brown used these precedent cases and decisions to determine the 
constitutionality of the Louisiana statute which required separation of 
races on railways. The question now was: Did the statute in question 
cover railways engaged in interstate commerce and was the railway in 
question engaged in interstate commerce? Justice Brown ruled that the 
statute did not apply to railways engaged in interstate commerce and 
that the East Louisiana Railway was only operating in the State of 
Louisiana. Thus, since the railway in the case under consideration 
strictly limited itself to intrastate commerce and transportation, its 
compliance with the Louisiana statute separating the races into dif-
ferent railway coaches was not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
39 
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of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court held; 
We think that the enforced separation of the races, as applied 
to the internal commerce of the state, does not abridge the privi— 
leges or immunities of the colored man. It does not deprive him 
of his property without due process of law nor does it deny him the 
equal protection of the law within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Justice Brown further strengthened his argument by using the acts 
of Congress requiring separate schools for the colored children in the 
District of Columbia as a parallel. If these acts were constitutional -
and their constitutionality had never been questioned - then there could 
be no question on the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute re-
quiring the separation of the races in public conveyances. 
The plaintiff argued that if a state had the right to require the 
separation of races on public conveyances the state could also require 
segregation on other arbitrary basis. For example, what would stop the 
state from requiring that people of one race walk on one side of the 
street and people of another race walk on the other side of the street? 
Or what would stop the state from separating certain nationalities from 
others or distinguishing between alien citizens and native citizens? 
The United States Supreme Court took this argument into consideration 
and Justice Brown expressed the Court's stand: 
The reply to all this is that every exercise of the "police 
power" must be "reasonable", and extend only to such laws as are 
enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good and 
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class. 42 
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The key word in this statement was "reasonable". As long as a statute 
passed by the state legislature was a piece of legislation which was 
in agreement with established usages, customs, and traditions of the 
people, the statute passed the test of reasonableness and was therefore 
constitutional. The Supreme Court again made it clear that the separation 
of races on public conveyances as required by the Louisiana statute was 
considered reasonable and thus constitutional. 
Plessy's argument that the separation of races stamped the colored 
race with a badge of inferiority was not accepted by the majority opinion 
judges. The judges felt that there was nothing found in the statute in 
question which would have advanced the idea of Negro inferiority. The 
judges also pointed out that social prejudices could not be overcome by 
legislation. If the two races were to meet on terms of social equality, 
it had to be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of 
each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. Justice 
Brown cited the decision handed down by the Court of Appeals of New York 
in the case of People v. Gallagher: 
Social equality of the two races can neither be accomplished 
nor promoted by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of 
the community upon whom they are designed to operate. 43 
Legislation can not eradicate social instincts or abolish distinctions 
based upon physical differences. Laws which conflict with the general 
sentiment of the community would only accentuate the difficulties of the 
existing situation. 
43 Evans, op.cit. , p. 1006 
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Thus, the Supreme Court went out of its way to make it clear 
that the separation of races in schools was considered just as consti-
tutional as the separation of races on public carriers. Separate 
schools have existed and have been found to be constitutional. The 
individual states exercised their "police power" and established 
separate schools with equal facilities for different races. This was 
a valid prerogative of the state's powers. 
The majority decision may be summarized as follows: 
1 . A state statute requiring separate accommodations for white and 
colored persons on railways does not violate the Thirteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 
2 . The provision of separate railway carriages for the white and 
colored races by railway companies engaged in intrastate passenger 
transportation was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. This provision did not deprive a 
colored person of any basic rights. 
3 . A law requiring the separation of the white and colored races in 
public conveyances was a "reasonable" exercise of the "police 
power" of a state. 
4. "Separate but equal" schools were constitutional since education was 
a state function and the states had the right under their "police 
power" to regulate schools and establish standards. Since separate 
schools for different races existed in Washington, D .C . , which is 
under the direct jurisdiction of Congress, it must be assumed that 
Congress sanctioned segregation in education. 
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Justice Harlan voiced a strong dissent. He regarded railways 
as public highways. To substantiate this point Justice Harlan intro-
duced the precedent case of Worcester v. Western R a i l w a y Corporation, 
in which the United States Supreme Court had held the following: 
The establishment of railways is regarded as a public work, 
established by public authority, intended for the public use and 
benefit, the use of which is secured to the whole community, and 
constitutes therefore, like a canal, turnpike, or highway, a 
public easement. 45 
These public highways not only had to transport all citizens regardless 
of race, but could not require separation of the races either. The 
statute requiring separation of the races passed by Louisiana was in-
consistent with (1) the equality of rights pertaining to citizenship, 
national and state, (2) the personal liberty enjoyed by everyone within 
46 
the United States. 
Justice Harlan saw a gross violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
He felt that the purpose of this Amendment was to guarantee to the newly 
emancipated Negro race all the civil rights that the white race already 
possessed. Justice Harlan further interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment 
as having meant that the laws of the states have to be the same for the 
black as well as the white and that the colored should have equal standing 
before the law. Furthermore, states could not discriminate against the 
colored solely on the basis of skin pigment. Harlan reminded the Court 
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that in previous cases the Fourteenth Amendment had been interpreted 
by the Supreme Court as follows: 
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but 
they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or 
right, most valuable to the colored race, the right to exemption 
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored -
exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil 
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights 
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race. 47 
Justice Harlan felt that the statute in question was an inter-
ference with the personal freedom of citizens. He interpreted personal 
freedom as "the right of locomotion, the power to move oneself to where-
ever one wanted to, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due 
48 
process of law". Thus, if a white man and a Negro chose to occupy 
the same coach in a railroad, they could do so and no government could 
prevent it without infringing upon the personal liberty of each. Justice 
Harlan was very concerned with the argument advanced by the plaintiff 
that states requiring segregation of races because of color could also 
require segregation on any other arbitrary basis such as nationality or 
religion. He argued that if the state has the power to pass statutes 
of the kind in question, then what would keep the state from passing laws 
requiring white citizens to walk on one side of the street and Negroes 
on the other, or separating naturalized citizens from native born citizens, 
or separating Protestants from Catholics? Harlan saw a snowballing of 
47 
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discriminatory laws if this statute in question was found constitutional. 
Justice Harlan pointed out that in view of the Constitution and 
in the eyes of the law there existed in this country no superior, dominant 
ruling class of citizens. The United States Constitution was colorblind 
and neither knew nor tolerated classes amongst its citizens. Justice 
Harlan underscored this point by stating: 
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the 
law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law re-
gards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or his 
color when the civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of 
the land are involved. It is therefore to be regretted that this 
high tribunal has reached the conclusion that it is competent for 
a state to regulate the enjoyment of citizens of their civil rights 
solely upon the basis of r a c e . 49 
Justice Harlan felt that the majority opinion handed down would 
have grave consequences. He saw the seeds of race hatred planted under 
the sanction of law. State enactments proceeding on the grounds that 
colored citizens were so inferior and degraded that they could not be 
allowed to sit in the same coaches with whites would arouse class hatred. 
Harlan reminded the Supreme Court that it had accepted the doctrine that 
states could not exclude qualified Negro jurors from a jury because of 
race. In the case in question the Supreme Court sanctioned the separation 
of races on public conveyances and schools on the basis of color. These 
two doctrines conflicted and could not be reconciled. 
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion may be summarized as follows: 
1. The Louisiana statute was a violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Plessy v. Ferguson 163 US (1896), op.cit., pp. 263-64 
i 
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Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
2. The rights guaranteed to the Negro in these amendments must be 
enforced in reality rather than just on paper. 
3 . Separate facilities on the basis of race were in violation of the 
individual's personal liberties guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
4. The majority opinion will cause race hatred and disunity within the 
United States. 
"Separate but equal" schools were unconstitutional and should be 
discontinued. 
Interpretation of the 1896 decision by authorities. 
Some people felt that this decision had a far reaching effect and 
had bad implications. John Marshall Harlan, a United States Supreme 
Court judge, had these misgivings: 
Our Constitution is colorblind and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens. In my opinion the judgement this day 
rendered will, in time, prove to the people of the United States 
to be quite as pernicious as the decision of the Dred Scott case.50 
Other individuals disagreed with the decision but on different 
grounds. Robert Leflar, Dean of the Arkansas Law School, made this 
statement: 
It is generally conceded that the experiment, so far as it 
depended in areas of governmental regulation upon a judicial 
guaranty of separate but equal facilities for Negroes and other 
minority races in the country, has failed to effectuate the theory 
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underlying it. Until recently, the governmental conduct required 
in public education by the "separate but equal" rule has seldom 
been clear, and when clear, has seldom been forthcoming.51 
The segregationist whites had achieved a major victory with the 
Plessy v. Ferguson decision. John W. Davis, a chief spokesman for 
segregation in the South and a lawyer, stated: 
Judicial statesmanship required the Court to accept the settled 
practices of the South. It was too late in the day to disturb the 
existing standards on any theoretical or sociological basis.52 
The result of the 1 8 9 6 decision was the perpetuation and expan-
sion of the dual school system which existed in the United States. Gover-
nor Vardaman of Mississippi spoke out against this dual system. He 
recommended that the legislature strike out all appropriations for Negro 
schools on the ground, that 
. . . . money spend today for the maintenance of the public school 
for Negroes is robbery of the white man and a waste upon the Negro. 
It does him no good, but it does him harm . . . . you spend it upon the 
Negro in an effort to make of the Negro that which God Almighty 
never intended should be made, and which man cannot accomplish. 53 
Thus, Governor Vardaman was against the Plessy ruling because he wanted 
education of whites only. 
Congressman William H. Fleming of Georgia made this statement: 
We do not know what shifting phases this vexing race problem 
may assume, but we may rest in the conviction that its ultimate 
solution must be reached along the lines of honesty and justice. 
Race differences may necessitate social distinction. But race 
differences cannot repeal the moral law. Let us solve the Negro 
problem by giving the Negro justice and applying to him the recog-
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nized principles of the moral law. This does not require social 
equality. But it does require that we recognize his fundamental 
rights as a man.54 
Henry Grady, a southern segregationist, stated: 
The whites and blacks must walk in separate paths in the South. 
As near as may be, these paths should be made equal - but separate 
they must be now and always. This means separate schools, separate 
churches, separate accommodation everywhere. 55 
Governor Thomas Banson Stanley of Virginia made the following 
statement concerning the United States Supreme Court decision: 
I contemplate no precipitate action, but I shall call together 
as quickly as practicable representatives of both state and local 
governments to consider the matter and work towards a plan which 
will be acceptable to our citizens and in keeping with the edict 
of the Court. 50 
Acceptance of the Decision. 
States that had separate school facilities for Negroes and whites 
continued to do so with the minimum amount of expenditures on the Negro 
schools. Between 1900 and 1930, for example, the average salary of a 
white teacher rose from $200 to $900 while the average salary of a Negro 
57 
teacher rose from $100 to $400. States with few or no schools for 
Negroes made no move to comply with the separate but equal decision of 
the United States Supreme Court. The result was that by 1916 there were 
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only sixty-seven Negro public high schools in the South with fewer than 
58 
20,000 students. The schools remained throughout the South "separate 
but unequal". 
The Negroes accepted the United States Supreme Court decision as 
law but lost no time in contesting this ruling. In 1899 a group of Negroes 
in Augusta, Georgia, brought an appeal before the United States Supreme 
Court. They demanded either admittance of Negro children to the white 
high school or reopening of the public high school for Negroes which had 
59 
been discontinued. The case was Cumming v. County Board of Education. 
Since Atlanta had segregated schools Negro children had no way of getting 
an education after the closing of the only Negro high school. Further-
more, Negroes as taxpayers were in essence supporting the segregated, 
white school without the community providing a tax supported Negro school. 
The United States Supreme Court not only held the Georgia school segre-
gation law constitutional, but went on to say that public funds could be 
used for a white high school even if the community had no equal provisions 
for a Negro high school. 
These temporary setbacks did not discourage the Negroes from trying 
again. A continuous stream of test cases was brought by the Negroes before 
the United States Supreme Court, all contesting the constitutionality of 
segregation. Some of the more important cases were Berea College v. Common-
wealth of Kentucky, 1908, where the United States Supreme Court upheld 
Kentucky's educational segregation law. In Jones v. Board of Education, 
1923, the United States Supreme Court held that there was inequality in 
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the education received by a Negro if an evaluation of the Negro school 
was made and it was found to be much lower than the white schools. In 
Gong Lum v. Rice, 1927, the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
Chinese were classified as colored and upheld the educational segregation 
laws of Mississippi. In State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 
Registrar of the University of Missouri, 1938, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Negro applicant must be admitted to the University 
of Missouri Law School since no Negro law school was available in Missouri. 
In Alston v . School Board of City of Norfolk, 1940, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to pay a Negro teacher, with the same qualifications as a white teacher, 
a smaller salary. In Sweatt v. Painter, 1950, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that the Negro applicant must be admitted to the university. 
The cases Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 1950, were decided in favor of the 
Negro plaintiffs by the United States Supreme Court. 60 
The Southern states were not alone in capitalizing on the "separate 
but equal" ruling of the Plessy v. Ferguson case. Some states in the North 
and West of the United States were equally guilty of maintaining large 
scale segregation in their schools and providing separate but unequal 
education for the Negroes. William R. Ming Jr. pointed this out in 1952 
when he stated: 
There are public schools and local school systems in the North 
60 
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and West with racial patterns and practices hardly distinguishable 
from the segregated school patterns of the Deep South. Among these 
states are New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Arizona, and 
New Mexico. 61 
Much of this segregation in public schools was brought about by residen-
tial restrictions. There were certain sections of towns where Negroes 
were not able to buy real estate nor rent. This was accomplished either 
by exhorbantly high prices for the real estate or refusal on the part of 
the owners to sell or rent. Consequently, these particular sections of 
town did not have to worry about mixed schools because no other race but 
the white one lived in the school district. 
The dual system which expanded greatly after the Plessy v. Ferguson 
ruling was an expensive venture. When a town build a school for its 
children and wanted to maintain segregation, it had to build, theoretically, 
two schools in order to meet the separate but equal requirement. Insist-
ance on segregation, thus, doubled the cost of education. Ironically, the 
states that did insist on segregation of children in education could not 
really afford this double expense. The seventeen states which, prior to 
1954 had made it mandatory to have a dual system of education all fell 
62 
in the low per capita income belt of the United States. Thus, the 
states which had a difficult time to provide adequate educational facili-
ties for one school system were most insistent on maintaining the dual 
system of education and thereby increase the cost even more. This resulted 
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in a lowering of educational standards of both white and Negro, schools. 
The money that could have provided adequate facilities for joint use was 
split up and resulted in inadequate facilities for both. The children 
of both races lost in the process. 
The Southern states soon realized that they could not fulfill the 
"separate but equal" ruling with the grossly unequal facilities that were 
provided for the education of the Negro. Several states started an all-
out drive to improve Negro educational facilities in order to create a 
greater resemblance of equality between Negro and white schools. It was 
the purpose of this program to spend the necessary money to insure the 
perpetuation of segregation. Thus, the Southern states were even willing 
to dip deep into their own pockets if they could be assured that segre-
gation could be maintained, by this action. Some cities and counties 
wanted to be doubly certain that segregation would be maintained and pro-
ceeded to build, superior Negro educational facilities. This way they 
could feel certain that their Negro population could not bring suit before 
the courts because of unequal and inferior facilities. This point was 
illustrated by the statement made by a Virginia state court when it de-
clared that 
. . . . it is evident that in twenty-nine of the even hundred counties 
in Virginia, the school facilities for the colored are equal to the white 
schools; in seventeen more they are now superior, and upon completion of 
work authorized, or in progress, another five will be superior. Of the 
twenty-seven cities, five have Negro schools and facilities equal to 
the white and eight more have better schools than the white. 63 
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In 1940-49, for example, Missouri had a per capita expenditure of 
64 
$175.32 for colored pupils and $166.31 for white pupils. 
This sudden increase in expenditures for Negro education on the 
part of the South was designed to show the United States Supreme Court 
and the country as a whole, that Negroes were getting an equal education. 
The South was unable to convince the Negro, the United States Supreme 
Court, or the country as a whole. 
Implications. 
1 . The decision handed down by the United States Supreme Court in the 
Plessy v. Ferguson case was a setback for democracy. The Court 
gave its stamp of approval to the perpetuation and expansion of 
segregation. 
2. Even though the Plessy v. Ferguson case dealt only with segregation 
in education and transportation, the segregationists were quick to 
interpret the ruling as applying to other fields as well, such as 
housing, theaters, restaurants. 
3 . Segregated schools resulted in inferior education for the Negroes. 
This in turn resulted in charges of Negro intellectual inferiority. 
4. The "separate but equal" doctrine was a myth and the education re-
65 
ceived by the Negroes was actually separate but unequal. 
5. The Plessy v. Ferguson ruling became law and a precedent. Any sub-
sequent segregation cases with the same or similar conditions, cir-
cumstances, and facts were decided according to this precedent. The 
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Plessy v. Ferguson ruling was in effect for fifty-eight years. 
6 . The Plessy decision opened the door to the expansion of segregation 
and race prejudice. No one is born with race prejudice. Prejudice 
is learned. Separate and segregated schools sanctioned by the law 
of the land were breeding grounds for race prejudice. Children 
looked upon the existing conditions as the only correct way. 
7. The Plessy decision resulted in a lowering of the educational quality 
and standards. Communities and states that were barely able to support 
one school system could not support a dual school system to satisfy 
the "separate but equal" decision and still maintain the same level of 
education. 
8 . The children of both, whites and Negroes, suffered because of the drop 
in the quality of education. 
9 . Certain sections of the United States Constitution, such as the Bill 
of Rights, seemed to be valid on paper only since the Negro citizens 
were not able to enjoy these rights. Negroes could reason that they 
were not obligated to fulfill their constitutional duties since their 
constitutional rights were not realized. 
SEPARATE BUT EQUAL EDUCATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
36 
Background to the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 
The plaintiffs in this case were Negro children of elementary 
school age residing in Topeka. The suit was brought before the United 
States District Court for the District of Kansas to prevent enforcement 
of a Kansas statute which permitted cities of more than 15,000 population 
to maintain separate school facilities for Negroes and whites. Topeka 
had a population greater than 15,000 and its Board of Education had de-
cided to establish segregated public elementary schools. This segregation 
was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The three judge District Court that heard 
the case ruled that segregation in public schools was indeed detrimental 
to the Negro children, but that relief could not be granted because the 
Negro and white school facilities were substantially equal with respect 
to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications 
31 
of teachers. The District Court, thus, followed precedent and decided 
in line with the "separate but equal" doctrine. The plaintiffs appealed 
the District Court's decision and a hearing was granted before the United 
States Supreme Court on December 8, 1953. The decision was handed down 
May 17, 1954. 
Actually on the case in question the United States Supreme Court 
considered several cases together and gave a consolidated opinion because 
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they all dealt with segregation in public schools. These cases came 
from Virginia, Delaware, South Carolina, and Kansas and even though 
they were premised on different facts and different local conditions, 
they still had a common legal question which justified their consider-
ation together. 
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice Warren. 
The justices in agreement were Justices Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix 
Frankfurter, William Douglas, Robert Jackson, Harold Burton, Tom Clark, 
and Sherman Minten. The decision of the United States Supreme Court was 
unanimous with no dissent. Justice Warren pointed out that it was the 
contention of the plaintiffs that segregated schools were not equal and 
could not be made equal and even if they could, they still would be in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus unconstitutional. Justice 
Warren went back in history and traced the Fourteenth Amendment since its 
adoption as it affected public education. He summed up his historical 
examination of the Fourteenth Amendment as follows; 
The most avid proponents of the post-war amendments undoubtedly 
intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons 
born or naturalized in the United States". Their opponents, just 
as certainly were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of 
the amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect, 
What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind can-
not be determined with any degree of certainty.32 
Justice Warren also found that the meaning and application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to public education was vague and in-
conclusive because a large part of the United States, especially the 
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South, did not have public education at that time. The education of 
the white children in the South was in the hands of private groups and 
education of Negroes was non existing in some states. In fact, education 
of Negroes WAS forbidden by law in many states (Mississippi, Alabama). 
Even though public schools existed in the North at that time, the Four-
teenth Amendment affected them little because no one associated the Four-
teenth Amendment with public education at the time of passage. These 
conditions brought Justice Warren to the conclusion that 
. . . . it is not surprising that there should be so little in the 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect 
on public education.33 
Justice Warren felt that the basic question was to determine how 
segregation affected public education. He did not think it enough to 
compare tangible factors such as buildings of Negro and white schools 
and draw a conclusion from there. Nor did he feel it enough to turn 
back the clock to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted or 1896 when the 
Plessy v. Ferguson decision was handed down, and try to solve today's 
problems in public education. Justice Warren saw only one way by which 
to approach the problem: 
We must consider public education in the light of its full de-
velopment and its present place in American life throughout the 
nation. Only in this way can it be determined, if segregation in 
public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection 
of the laws. 34 
Justice Warren pointed out the importance of education in our 
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society in our time; 
Today education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education in our democratic society. 35 
Education was necessary for good citizenship and was essential for the 
perpetuation of democracy. Any child deprived of an education today has 
great difficulties in succeeding in life. Therefore, continued Justice 
Warren, 
. . . the opportunity of an education, where the state has under-
taken to provide, it is a right which must be made available to all 
on equal terms. 36 
Justice Warren felt that the primary question to be answered was; 
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the 
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other tangible 
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of 
equal educational opportunities? We, the United States Supreme Court 
judges, believe that it does. 
To substantiate his opinion, and that of the other judges in agreement, 
Warren went back to the ruling in the Sweatt v. Painter case where the 
United States Supreme Court had ruled that 
. . . . a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them 
equal educational opportunities even though the physical facilities 
may be of equal quality. 
The Court in this case came to this conclusion because it took into con-
sideration : 
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. . . . those qualities which are incapable of objective measure-
ment but which make for greatness in a law school. Tangible factors 
can not be used solely when determining equality of education. 39 
Justice Warren cited the case of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents where 
the Court again resorted to intangible considerations and ruled that a 
Negro admitted to a white school must be treated like all other students 
and that 
. . . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and ex-
change views with other students, and in general to learn his 
profession (must be made possible). 40 
Justice Warren continued that these intangible considerations must also 
be applied to grade and high schools. There, too, a Negro was deprived 
of equal educational opportunity because merely having equal facilities 
did not constitute equal educational opportunity. Furthermore, to sepa-
rate children of the same age in public schools solely because of race 
would generate a feeling of inferiority in the minds of the children of 
the minority race. This feeling of inferiority could affect the hearts 
and minds of these children in a way that may not be possible to be 
remedied. Justice Warren illustrated these points by citing a previous 
Kansas case where the Kansas court had declared: 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has 
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is 
greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of 
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiori-
ty of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation 
of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, 
has a tendency to retard the educational ana mental development of 
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Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they 
would receive in racially integrated school systems. 41 
Justice Warren was of the opinion that these points brought out in the 
above decision were amply supported by modern authorities in sociology, 
psychology, psychiatry, and education. 
After the examination of tangible as well as intangible factors 
Justice Warren and his fellow justices came to the following conclusion: 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine 
of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plain-
tiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been 
brought are, by reason of segregation complained of, deprived of 
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed, by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion 
whether such segregation also violated the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applica-
bility of this decision, and because of the great variety of local 
conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents 
problems of considerable complexity . . . . the consideration of 
appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary 
question - the constitutionality of segregation in public education. 
We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assist-
ance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be re-
stored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present 
further argument. 
Thus, the Court declared state enforced racial segregation in public 
schools unconstitutional and invalid. Yet the decision's effect was 
delayed by keeping the case on docket for further argument as to methods 
of enforcement. 
The United States Supreme Court's decision may be summarized as 
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follows: 
1. The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the 
basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, 
but in the light of the full development of public education and its 
present place in American life throughout the nation. 
2 . The history of the Fourteenth Amendment was inconclusive as to its 
intended effect on public education. 
3 . States must make education in public schools available to all on 
equal terms. 
4. Segregation of children in public schools deprived children of the 
minority group of equal educational opportunities, even though the 
physical facilities and other tangible factors were equal. 
5 . The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson had 
no place in public education. 
6. Segregation of white and Negro children in public schools of a state 
on the basis of race denied to the Negro children the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore 
unconstitutional. 
The case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka was reargued on 
the question of relief and enforcement April 11-l4, 1955. The decision 
was handed down May 31, 1955. Justice Warren again delivered the opinion 
of the United States Supreme Court which was again unanimous. Justice 
Warren stated: 
. . . . the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in 
public education is unconstitutional, is incorporated herein by 
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reference .(from the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
decision) 
Justice Warren explained that a re argument was granted because the 
cases had arisen under different local conditions with a variety of local 
problems. He further noted that the United States District Attorney, the 
States of Florida, Worth Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, and 
Texas had filed briefs for the rehearing and had participated in the oral 44 
arguments. 
Justice Warren was aware of the complexity of the transition 
problems and stated; 
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may 
require solution of varied local school problems . . . . court will 
have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitute 
good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. 
Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need 
for further hearing, the courts which originally heard these cases 
can best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe 
it appropriate to remand the cases to these courts. 45 
Thus the United States Supreme Court charged the lower federal courts 
with the duty to carry out the decision handed down in the Brown case 
and to hear and decide any further litigation dealing with school segre-
gation. Justice Warren further explained the Supreme Court's rulings 
. . . . while giving weight to public and private considerations, 
courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reason-
able start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954 ruling. 
Once such a start had been made . . . . the burden rests upon the de-
fendants to establish that additional time is necessary in the 
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public interest and is consistant with good faith compliance at the 
earliest practicable date. During this period of transition the 
courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases. 
. . . . these cases are made remanded to the District Courts to take 
such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistant with 
this opinion as are necessary and proper and to admit to public 
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate 
speed the parties to these cases. 46 
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in its 1955 decision 
of the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka case may be summarized as 
follows: 
1 . Racial discrimination in public schools was unconstitutional as was 
brought out in the 1954 decision. 
2. The cases were remanded to the District Courts whose duty it was to 
enforce the United States Supreme Court decision and abolish segre-
gated public schools with "all deliberate speed". 
3 . Courts will have to determine whether the action of school authorities 
constituted good faith compliance with the constitutional principle 
or whether it was merely a delaying tactic. 
4. The courts which originally heard the cases could best perform this 
judicial appraisal. 
5. Defendants had to make a prompt and reasonable start toward full 
compliance with the ruling of the United States Supreme Court. 
6 . Additional time may be granted by the lower federal courts to certain 
defendants if proven necessary. 
7. During the period of transition the lower federal courts will have 
jurisdiction over the cases. 
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Interpretation of the 1954 and 1955 decisions by authorities. 
Not all Americans agreed with and accepted the decision handed 
down by the United States Supreme Court. Professor Cahn, a lawyer, 
stated: 
We should not have the constitutional rights of Negroes - or 
of other Americans - rest on such flimsy foundation as sane of 
the scientific demonstrations in the records. It is one thing to 
use the current scientific findings, however ephemeral they may be, 
in order to ascertain whether the legislature has acted reasonably 
in adopting some scheme of social or economic regulation; deference 
here is shown not so much to the findings as to the legislature. It 
is quite another thing to have our fundamental rights rise, fall 
or change, along with the latest fashions of psychological litera-
ture. 47 
Jack Greenberg, assistant counsel of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, commented on the Court's decisions and 
disagreed with the above argument: 
Social scientist's testimony was used in wholly different and 
new ways in the recent school segregation cases. T h e r e , by placing 
before the Court authoritative scientific opinions regarding the 
effect of racial classification and of "separate but equal" treat-
ment, the plaintiffs helped persuade the Court in the shaping of 
a judge-made rule of law.48 
Southern segregationists brought up the old argument of intellectual 
Negro inferiority. Judge Bradey, a southerner serving on a local court, 
stated: 
We don't know what happens to the brain of man, but we do know 
that the Negro's brain pan seals and hardens quicker than the white 
man's. We do know that the Negro has, in certified instances, 
elliptical blood cells, which cause disease. We do know that his 
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skull is one-eighth inch thicker, and we do know he has to have 
two determiners to have his kinky black hair. We don't know what 
it takes to make his mind different from our mind. This Supreme 
Court seeks to set aside all laws of eugenics and biology. 49 
A three judge district court in South Carolina interpreted the 
Brown decision as follows: 
It is important that we point out exactly what the Supreme 
Court has decided and what it has not decided in these cases. It 
has not decided that the Federal Courts are to take over or regu-
late the public schools of the states. It has not decided that the 
states must mix persons of different races in the schools or must 
require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the right of 
choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided, and all it 
has decided, is that a state may not deny to any person on account 
of race the right to attend any school that it maintains . . . . The 
Constitution, In other words, does not require integration, it 
merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation 
as occurs as a result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the 
use of governmental power to enforce segregation. 
Federal district judge William H. Atwell of Dallas, Texas, 
criticized the United States Supreme Court decisions by this statement: 
The Court bases its decisions on no law but rather on what the 
Court regarded as more authoritative, modern psychological know-
ledge. This is not enough.51 
United States Senator Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia introduced a 
constitutional amendment in the United States Senate in i960 which was 
designed to restore to the states exclusive control over public education. 
It was also designed to prohibit the enforcement of the Brown decision 
by the federal courts. Specifically Senator Talmadge stated: 
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The Talmadge School Amendment is neither a segregation nor an 
integration measure. It rather is a proposal to reassert affirma-
tively the time honored right of local people to administer their 
schools on the state and local levels in accordance with prevailing 
conditions, circumstances and attitudes. Under it school patrons 
in each state would be free to determine for themselves through 
their elected representatives whether segregation, integration,or 
some median procedure, would best serve the interests of their 
children and states. 52 
Thus, Talmadge proposed that the citizens of each community and state 
should decide whether or not integration or segregation should be em-
ployed. Senator Talmadge was supported in his proposal by Senators 
Harry Byrd and Willis Robertson of Virginia, Olin Johnston of South 
Carolina, Lister Hill and John Sparkman of Alabama, James Eastland and 
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John Stennes of Mississippi, and Russell Long of Louisiana. The pro-
posed amendment was not adopted. 
Georgia's Attorney General Eugene Cook condemned the Brown decisions 
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People which 
. . . . either knowingly or unwittingly has allowed itself to be-
come part and parcel of the communist conspiracy to overthrow the 
democratic governments of this nation and its sovereign states. 54 
Cook, therefore, equated the fight of the Negroes for their constitutional 
rights with conspiracy and an attempt to overthrow the democratic govern-
ment of the United States. 
The Southern Baptist Convention which was held in St. Louis in 1954 
made their viewpoint known concerning the United States Supreme Court de-
cisions in the Brown cases by this statement: 
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We recognize that these Supreme Court decisions are in harmony 
with the constitutional guarantees of equal freedom to all citizens 
and with the Christian principles of equal justice and love for all 
men . . . . We urge our people and all Christians to conduct themselves 
in this period of adjustment in the spirit of Christ. 
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, one of the most influential newspapers 
in the United States, made this comment on the Brown decisions: 
In the friendliest possible way we would advise southern leaders 
that the time has come to stop explaining why they do not like the 
Supreme Court decision, and to start building public acceptance in 
the South for carrying out that decision. And we know of no better 
way to build public acceptance than to do what many communities have 
done - to begin integration.56 
The Jackson Daily News of Jackson, Mississippi, bitterly attacked 
the Brown decisions and vowed resistance at any condition and cost. 
The Supreme Court tells the Federal tribunals in the various 
states to require school boards to make a prompt and reasonable 
start toward full compliance. It won't happen in Mississippi. We 
are slow starters, and this is one time we won't start at a l l . Any 
attempt toward a start in this state is going to be met with stern 
resistance right at the beginning. 57 
Not all Southern newspapers adhered to the extreme opposition 
voiced by the Jackson Daily News. The Nashville Tennessean spoke for 
the moderate southerners when it stated: 
The fact is that the decision of the Supreme Court, as the 
highest court of our own state has twice pointed out, has made a 
dead letter of compulsory segregation in Tennessee. The sooner 
that fact is accepted the better it will be for all concerned. 
For the Supreme Court's decisions are not going to be reversed by 
"manifesto" or circumvented by legislation. 58 
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Acceptance and Evasion of the Brown decisions. 
Just as the opinions of individuals varied so did the actions of 
different states and cities. Many states and cities complied immediately. 
On the day following the 1954 decision, for example, President Eisenhower 
announced that the District of Columbia would immediately become the 
nation's showcase in public school integration. It soon became evident 
that there was a different degree of compliance with the Supreme Court 
decision in border states and states constituting the Deep South. While 
there was considerable legal resistance to desegregation in the states 
of the Deep South, such as Alabama, there was an absence of significant 
59 
resistance in border states, such as Missouri. The large urban centers 
seemed to encounter less resistance to desegregation than did rural areas 
and small towns. One of the reasons for this occurrence was precondition-
ing. Negroes had been admitted to labor unions on an equal basis in the 
urban centers and cities. Thus, the integration in urban areas did not 
come about suddenly, but moved on a gradual scale over a period of years. 
In the rural areas there occurred no gradual integration. Strict segre-60 
gation remained the rule rather than the exception in the rural South. 
Southern segregationist states passed legal measures to circumvent 
the mandate of the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka case. The various 
legal attempts adopted by some states to evade and avoid desegregation of 
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the public schools, fell into several categories. Many of the Southern 
states reintroduced the pre-Civil War doctrine of "interposition and 
61 
nullification". This doctrine was part of the states rights philosophy. 
According to the states rights philosophy the central government was a 
compact among the several sovereign states. Since the states were sovereign 
they had the right to determine the constitutionality of any act of federal 
authority. This meant that a state could declare a federal act uncon-
stitutional, null, and void because the state had the right to interpose 
its sovereignty between the central government and the citizen of the states 
Applying this doctrine to the integration-segregation dispute the states 
rights proponents maintained that the states could declare the ruling of the 
United States Supreme Court in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka case unconstitutional. The Federal Government denied that the 
doctrine of interposition was valid and that the states had the right to 
declare a federal act unconstitutional and nullify it . A 1903 case, the 
case of Marbury v. Madison, brought out that the United States Supreme 
Court had the ultimate power in determining the constitutionality of federal 
acts. Justice Marshall expressed the opinion of the Court and declared the 
doctrine of interposition invalid when he stated; 
If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, anull the 
judgements of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights 
acquired under these judgements, the Constitution itself becomes a 
solemn mockery; and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing 
its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. 62 
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Virginia was the first state to use the interposition doctrine 
after the 195U decision of the United States Supreme Court. An inter-
position act was introduced into the Virginia General Assembly in 1956 
asserting the right of the state to maintain a segregated school system. 
The act declared that 
Virginia is under no obligation to accept supinely an unlawful 
decree of the Supreme Court of the United States based upon an 
authority which is not found in the Constitution of the United 
States or any amendment thereto. 63 
A few weeks later the Virginia General Assembly adopted the proposed act 
and declared that it was interposing the sovereignty of Virginia against 
encroachment upon its reserved powers by the federal government. Other 
states followed suit and also adopted interposition acts. 
Still other states enacted resolutions based upon the Tenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment provided that all powers 
that were not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, and 
were not prohibited by it to the states, were reserved to the states re-
64 
spectively, or to the people. Since the power to desegregate public 
schools was not specifically granted to the Federal Government in the 
Constitution nor prohibited by the Constitution to the states, some states 
felt that it necessarily was a prerogative of the states or the people to 
act on the segregation issue. These states used the "police power" clause 
in their argument. Louisiana, for example, used its police power as 
authority and adopted legislation requiring the separation of races in 
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public schools, A statement of purpose followed the segregation re-
quirement and the purpose of its action was "to promote and protect 
public health, morals, better education, and the peace and good order 
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in the state and not because of race". A special three judge federal 
district court dealt with this evasion tactic used by Louisiana and de-
clared it invalid and unconstitutional because it violated the ruling 
of the United States Supreme Court in the Brown case. 
Some Southern states had other tactics "which were designed to 
forestall judicial enforcement of the 1954 decision (see Table I ) . The 
United States Supreme Court had charged the lower federal courts with 
the responsibility of enacting and implementing the decision handed 
down. However, the lower federal courts could not act until a desegre-
gation case was in litigation before them. The South capitalized on 
this situation by creating legal barriers designed to keep a potential 
plaintiff from seeking judicial remedy. In the first place few Negroes 
could afford the expense of litigation. Consequently, it fell upon 
groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People and the Congress for Racial Equality to finance and back test 
cases. The Southern states retaliated by trying to prevent the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People from operating in the 
individual states because this group was an out-of-state corporation, 
directed from New York, which had failed to register as such a corporation 
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in the individual states. The National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People went to court with the argument that the state 
groups were separate and not directed from New York. The court ruled 
in favor of the Southern states and ordered the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People to register. Registration meant 
publication of its members and contributors. This was where the Southern 
states were able to use a second method to keep the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People from operating and, in essence, 
keep cases from being brought before the federal courts. Now that the 
states knew the names of the members and backers of this group, the 
states enacted legislation which prohibited any state agency from hiring 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People members or 
contributors. Furthermore, some Southern states, such as Alabama and 
Louisiana, passed laws making it a crime for organizations (such as the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) to institute 
67 
desegregation litigation in the courts. 
Another device used by some states to circumvent the Supreme Court's 
decision was to require potential plaintiffs in desegregation suits to 
prepare a long and complicated statement in which they had to list the 
names of individuals or organizations that had contributed to or advised 
them in their suit. If the plaintiff refused to disclose this information 
he was refused, a hearing and was punished for withholding information. If 
the plaintiff did reveal the names of individuals and organizations that 
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supported him then those persons or groups were subject to community 
reprisal such as economic sanction. This whole scheme was meant to 
lessen the number of desegregation proceedings introduced.. 
North Carolina adopted a different method, to get around the de-
segregation decision. All public school children in that state were 
placed in elementary or high schools by the use of an "pupil assignment 
plan". This plan authorized the school boards to determine who would 
be sent to which school. The intentions and results were obvious. The 
school board assigned Negro students and white students to separate 
schools. Coupled with this assignment plan was the "exhaustion of 
68 
remedies" doctrine. This doctrine capitalized on the fact that no 
appeal from any plaintiff contesting the assignment plan could be heard 
by any federal court until all the state courts had been exhausted. 
Thus, if a person wanted to contest the assignment plan he would first 
of all appeal before the school board. If the school board failed to 
grant him relief, he would have to appeal to the state superior court. 
The plaintiff would thus have to appeal his case all the way up to the 
state supreme court before being able to get his case before a federal 
court. This appealing process through the state court's hierarchy was 
not only time consuming but also costly. Not many individuals were 
willing to go through all the steps, expense, and trouble to contest 
the unjust measures and the Southern states knew this. 
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A further method used to avoid the consequences of the Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka case was the use of a classification factor 
such as a certain level of scholastic achievement or aptitude. Florida 
passed a law which stated: 
The rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Board may in-
clude, but not limit themselves, to provisions for the conduct of 
such uniform tests as may be deemed necessary or advisable in 
classifying the pupils according to intellectual ability and scholastic 
proficiency to the end that there will be established in each school 
within the county an environment of equality among pupils of like 
qualifications and academic attainments. In the preparation and 
conduct of such tests and in classifying the pupils for assignment 
to the schools they will attend, the Board shall take into account 
sociological, psychological, and like intangible social scientific 
factors. In designating the school to which pupils may "be assigned 
there shall be taken into consideration the availability of facili-
ties and teaching capacity of the several schools. The scholastic 
aptitude, intelligence, mental energy, or ability of the pupil 
applying for admission and the psychological, moral, ethical, and 
cultural background and qualifications of the pupils previously 
assigned. to the school in which admission is sought must compare 
favorably. 69 
It was readily apparent that this vague statute provided ample chance for 
the State of Florida to achieve its underlying purpose, namely to continue 
segregation in public schools. The statute as such did not make any mention 
of race or segregation, but the end result and intent was that of racial 
segregation. If this statute would be enforced literally without regard 
to race or color, it would be constitutional. The burden of proof that 
the statute was not enforced literally was upon the Negro race. 
Virginia used still another tactic to evade compliance with the 
1954 decision. Under a plan adopted by Virginia any child that objected 
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to being assigned to a non-segregated school would be free to attend a 
segregated school. This was a very sensible plan on the surface but the 
white Virginians knew all too well that no white child in Virginia would 
attend a non-segregated school. For all practical purposes, then, there 
would still be the dual school set-up of separate white and Negro schools. 
The school boards further encouraged the enactment of the above proposed 
plan by passing a resolution which stated: 
No public revenue will be given for the support of public schools 
in counties wherein white and colored children are taught together 
under any plan or arrangement whatsoever. 
Another popular method used was called the "neighborhood school 
7 1 
plan". Under this plan secondary schools were often zoned geographically 
or graduates of certain elementary schools were assigned to specific high 
schools within their residential zone. This policy has had its greatest 
effect at the elementary level because elementary schools usually serve 
smaller residential areas than do secondary schools. If the geographical 
area was kept small the chances for only one race living in that area 
were greater. Some people called this method a clear case of gerrymander-
ing of school attendance boundaries. Nevertheless, some states have used 
it successfully. 
Some Southern states realized that nothing was said in the 1954 
and 1955 decisions concerning the status of private schools. The ruling 
of the United States Supreme Court applied only to public schools. 
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Southerners hoped to avoid desegregation by separating the public schools 
from the state and making private schools out of them. Some states did 
this by giving state money in form of tuition grants to white students 
to enable them to attend one of the private schools. Another way of 
accomplishing the same thing was to close all public schools and lease 
these facilities to private persons or organizations who then reopened, 
them and called them private schools. These private schools were, of 
course, expected to carry on with segregated education. 
Table I summarizes the evasive procedures used, by the different 
states and the delaying legislation adopted. In computing the chart the 
author has used the Southern states because they were more concerned with 
and disturbed by the 1954 decision and these states knew what this ruling 
was designed to accomplish. However, this did not imply that the same 
tactics were not used in other states. 
Studies were made to measure the effectiveness of the 1954 decision 
and the extent of success that segregationist states had experienced with 
their evasive measures and delaying techniques. In his book With All 
Deliberate Speed Don Shoemaker made a study on the effectiveness and 
acceptance of the 1954 decision. He concluded that the 1954 decision 
had been slowed down and not been carried out to the fullest extent and 
that the evasive and delaying techniques of certain states had been 
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successful. His stand was supported by data which he collected and 
which comprises Tables I and I I . 
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Types of Legislation Adopted by Segregationist States Since 
1954 Designed to Prevent Desegregation. 
Ala . Ark. Fla. Ga. La. Miss. N.C. S . C. Tenn. Texas Va. 
1 . Abolition of schools by local 
(O)ption or (L)egislation 
0 L L ,0 0 L 0 
2. Grants for Private Education X x x X 
3« Sale or Lease of School Facilities X X X X 
4. Use of Public Funds for Segregated 
Schools only 
X X X X 
5. Specific Pupil Assignment X X x x x x X X 
6 . Compulsory attendance (R)epeal 
(M)odification 
M M M M R M R M M 
7. Extraordinary powers for Governor X X X 
8. Teacher Employment Laws (R)epeal 
(M)odification 
M M M R R 
9. Restriction on Pro-Integration groups X X X X X X X X 
10.Interposition, Nullification, Protest X X X X X X X X 
X X X 
11.Use of State Sovereignty or Police 
power 
X X X X 
X 
12.Study Committee to Work on 
Segregation Issue 
X X X X X X 
X 
13.Provisions to keep schools segregated X X X X 
X 
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TABLE I I 
Extent of Segregation and Desegregation as of June 30, 1957. 
Total 
School district 
Biracial Desegregated 
Total Enrollment 
White Negro 
Pupils in Integrated 
Situations 
White Negro 
Alabama 
111 
111 0 471,900 36.6% 0 0 
Arkansas 423 228 5 316,709 24.3% 9000 940 
Delaware 106 61 18 53,904 17.5% 25,706 5,145 
Washington,D.C 1 1 1 34,758 68.0% 3l+,758 73,723 
Florida 67 67 0 594,220 21.8% 0 0 
Georgia 200 195 0 644,238 31.8% 0 0 
Kentucky 219 196 0 551,771 6.6% 200,000 22,000 
Louisiana 67 67 0 375,000 37.5% 
0 0 
Maryland 24 
Mississippi 151 
Missouri 3,500 
North Carolina 172 
South Carolina 107 
Texas 1,800 
23 
151 
244 
172 
107 
841 
20 
0 
202 
0 
0 
103 
397,417 
273,722 
677,500 
724, 302 
319,670 
1,565,568 
21.6% 
49.5% 
9.0% 
19.3% 
43.2% 
13.7% 
384,150 
0 
0 
0 
0 
500,000 
89,668 
0 
59,000 
0 
0 
25,000 
Virginia 
114 114 
0 566,696 24.5% 
0 0 
5
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Another study was undertaken by the Civil Rights Commission in 
1963. Its findings are tabulated in Tables I I I and IV. The findings 
of the Civil Rights Commission were similar to those in Shoemaker's 
study, namely that the 1954 decision was not as effective as it should 
73 
have been and had not accomplished its objectives in many instances. 
After comparison of the figures quoted by Shoemaker in 1957 with the 
figures published by the Civil Rights Commission in 1963, it became 
apparent that tremendous progress had been made in several states con-
cerning desegregation. At the same time it became obvious that other 
states had taken no steps whatsoever toward desegregation of their public 
schools. For example, when comparing the total number of school districts 
and number of desegregated, school districts in Alabama in 1957 with the 
total number of school districts and number of desegregated districts 
in 1 9 6 3 , the reader will find that no steps towards compliance with the 
United States Supreme Court decision had been taken. In 1957 Alabama 
had 1 1 1 school districts none of which were desegregated; in 1 9 6 3 it had 
114 school districts and still none desegregated. Mississippi was an-
other example of inactivity in the desegregation question. In 1957 
Mississippi had 151 school districts and none of them desegregated; in 
1963 Mississippi had 150 school districts and still none desegregated. 
On the other hand, by examining Tables I I and I I I the reader will 
find that some states made respectable progress in their desegregation 
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effort of public schools. Delaware, for example, had only eighteen 
out of 106 school districts desegregated in 1957. In 1963 the 106 
school districts were unified into eighty-seven school districts and all 
eighty-seven were desegregated. Another glaring example was Kentucky 
which had. 219 school districts in 1957 of which none were desegregated. 
In 1963, 149 of the 205 school districts were desegregated. 
Several states used the "with all deliberate speed" clause of the 
Brown decision to their advantage. These states did not refuse to comply 
with the United States Supreme Court decision but desegregated at such 
a slow pace that their action bordered on non-compliance. Arkansas, for 
example, had 423 school districts in 1957 of which five were desegregated. 
In 1963 Arkansas had 416 school districts of which twelve were desegre-
gated,, This amounted to seven additional desegregated schools in six 
years. Another state using this slow pace of desegregation was Georgia. 
In 1957 Georgia had 200 school districts of which none were desegregated. 
In 1963 Georgia had 198 school districts of which one was desegregated. 
The same was true with Louisiana which had sixty-seven school districts in 
1957 with none of them desegregated. In 1963 Louisiana had sixty-seven 
school districts with one of them desegregated. 
Northern states, which had clauses requiring segregation in education 
in their state constitutions, had repealed these requirements by the mid-
nineteenth century. Thus, the Brown decision affected these states little. 
However, there were charges brought by Negroes in several states alleging 
de facto segregation in education caused by segregated housing. 
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TABLE I I I 
Status of Desegregation of School Districts ('62-'63) 
Total School 
Districts 
Total with White 
and Negro Pupils 
No. of School Dist. 
Desegregated 
No. of School 
Dist. Segregated 
Alabama 114 l14 0 
114 
Arkansas 
416 
228 12 216 
Delaware 87 87 87 0 
Washington,D.C. 1 1 1 0 
Florida 67 67 10 57 
Georgia 198 182 1 181 
Kentucky- 205 166 149 17 
Louisiana 67 67 1 66 
Maryland 24 23 23 0 
Mississippi 150 150 0 150 
Missouri 1,607 213 203 10 
North Carolina 173 173 18 155 
Oklahoma 1,180 241 196 45 
South Carolina 108 108 0 108 
Tennessee 151 143 26 117 
Texas 
1,461 
919 177 742 
Virginia 130 128 32 96 
W. Virginia 55 43 43 0 
6,197 3,053 
Total 
Percent 
979 
32.1 
2,074 
67.9 
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TABLE IV 
Status of Segregation-Desegregation ('62 —'63) 
Total 
Enrollment 
White Negro 
Negroes enrolled in 
desegregated 
schools 
Percent of total 
Negro pupils enrolled 
in desegregated schools 
Alabama 807,287 527 , 075 280,212 0 0 
Arkansas 448,616 331,552 117,064 247 .211 
Delaware 90,761 73,769 16,992 9,498 55.9 
Washington,D.C 132 , 900 22,141 110,759 87,749 79.2 
Florida 1, l83,714 956,423 227,291 1,551 .682 
Georgia 987,385 562,255 325,141 
44 
.O14 
Kentucky 655,000 610,000 45,000 24,346 54.1 
Louisiana 759,990 458,270 301,720 107 .035 
Maryland 667,528 514,313 153,215 69,147 
45.1 
Mississippi 590,000 300,000 290,000 0 
0 
Missouri 857,620 767,620 90,000 35,000 38.19 
North Carolina 900,641 800,289 341,352 879 .256 
Oklahoma 560,000 515,200 44,800 10,557 23.6 
South Carolina 630,628 365,340 265,288 0 0 
Tennessee 829,686 670,387 159,299 1,810 
1.14 
Texas 2,255,593 1,951,613 303,980 7,000 2.3 
Virginia 933,830 704.725 229,105 1,230 .537 
W. Virginia 438,128 412,878 25,250 1,550 61.4 
Total 13,970,307 10,643,839 3,326,468 264,665 8.0 
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Implications of the 1954 and 1955 Decisions. 
1. The Negroes had the law on their side now and they were able to 
press for speedy desegregation. 
2. The segregationists had received a setback but were not ready to 
give up the fight. 
3 . The result was much tension and disunity within the United States 
at a time when the world as a whole was full of crises. 
4. The tension resulted in violence and in an increase in activity by 
the opposing forces. 
5. The Negroes, equipped with the 1954 and 1955 decisions, were ready 
to bring numerous cases to the courts where compliance to the de-
cisions had not been instituted. 
6. The courts followed precedent, namely the Brown decisions, and de-
cided in favor of the Negro plaintiffs. 
7. The segregationists, unable to back their position with any legal 
decision, refused to cooperate and accept the validity of the United 
States Supreme Court decisions. 
8 . The United States received a black eye in its prestige standing 
around the world because it became apparent that the law abiding 
citizens of this democracy refused to abide the law established 
by the United States Supreme Court in its Brown decisions. 
9 . Even though the Brown decisions dealt only with segregation in 
public education and declared it unconstitutional, it implied that 
all other segregation, such as theaters, jobs, housing, lunchcounters, 
etc. was equally unconstitutional. 
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10. The Brown decisions were a step toward a better and truer democracy. 
As the leader in the fight for freedom and democracy in today's 
world, the United States could not practice discrimination within 
its borders and preach freedom and democracy to the world. 
11. The Brown decisions constituted the official stand of the United 
States Government on the segregation question. This stand increased 
the United States' prestige around the world, especially in the 
newly developing countries of Africa. 
Decisions since 1954 handed down by the United States Supreme 
Court dealing with segregation in education. 
Several cases dealing with segregation have been brought to the 
United States Supreme Court since the 1954 and 1955 decisions. In the 
1955 case of Lucy et al. v. Adams, the United States Supreme Court 
ordered the University of Alabama to admit Miss Lucy, a Negro, to the 
University as a student. She was admitted but expelled a few days later 
for disciplinary reasons. In the 1956 case of the State of Florida ex 
rel Hawkins v. Board of Central, the United States Supreme Court ordered 
admission of Hawkins, a Negro, to the Florida College of Law. In the 
1958 case of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People v. State of Alabama the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People to keep its membership lists secret. 
In the 1958 case of Cooper v. Aaron the United States Supreme Court denied 
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the Little Rock, Arkansas, high schools a petition requesting the right 
to delay the start of integration for two and one half years. In the 
1959 case of County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, v . 
Allen, the United States Supreme Court denied a request by the county 
to nullify the decision of a lower federal court which had ordered 
immediate integration of schools. The most recent cases dealing with 
segregation-integration of educational institutions were the University 
of Alabama and the University of Mississippi cases. In both cases the 
federal courts ordered admission of the Negro applicants. The Federal 
Government proved that it was going to use all necessary means to en-
force its decision. Other universities, such as Georgia Tech, integrated 
peacefully and without much publicity. According to a survey by the 
Southern Educational Reporting Service , by 1960 a total of 124 Southern 
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white colleges and universities admitted Negro students. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to (1) examine the United States 
Supreme Court cases of 1896 and. 1954-55 dealing with the integration-
segregation problem in public schools; (2) analyze the opinions of the 
different justices on the cases; (3) consider the interpretations of 
the decisions of the Court by various authorities; and (4) determine 
the implications of these decisions. 
The procedures used in making this study were (1) an examination 
of the texts of the selected cases and (2) a survey of the literature 
available in the Kansas State University Library concerning the problem 
of integration-segregation in public schools with special emphasis on 
the selected cases. 
The educational opportunities of the American Negro from the dis-
covery of the New World to the present may be summarized as follows: 
1. During the 17th and 18th centuries the American Negro had little 
opportunity to receive an education. Only a few organizations and 
individuals were interested in educating the Negro. 
2 . During the 19th and 20th centuries more and more educational 
opportunities were provided for the American Negro. However, this 
early education of the Negro took place on a segregated basis. 
Slowly the Negroes started contesting segregated, education in the 
courts as being in violation of the Constitution of the United States 
of America. 
In 1896 the United States Supreme Court dealt with the integration 
segregation question in public education in the case Plessy v. Ferguson. 
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The Court's decision may be summarized as follows: 
1 . Separate but equal education is not in violation of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and is 
therefore constitutional. 
2 . States under their police power have the right to regulate education. 
3 . The regulation of education in the states by use of the police power 
must be reasonable. 
In 1954-55 the United States Supreme Court again dealt with the 
integration-segregation question in public education in the case of Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka. The Court's decision may be summarized as 
follows: 
1 . Separate but equal education is in violation with the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United. States Constitution. 
2 . The separate but equal doctrine has no place in today's education 
and is unconstitutional. 
3 . The lower federal courts were charged with the duty of enforcing the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court and abolish segregation 
in public schools with all deliberate speed. 
The United States Supreme Court dealt with a specific situation 
in each case. However, the Justices, whether agreeing with the majority 
opinion or giving a dissenting opinion, elaborated on their conception 
of the meaning of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. They also 
made it clear what their interpretation of "equality of opportunity" was. 
It was upon these opinions that lay persons based their interpretations 
of the Supreme Court's decisions. For the most part these lay persons 
chose to either interpret the opinion of the Supreme Court as simply an 
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approval or a ban on the practice dealt with in the case, or they drew 
wide implications from the opinions which encompassed practices other 
than the ones specifically dealt with in the case. 
It is important to note that none of the Justices in their 
opinions dealing with a case denied the importance of equal opportunities 
and the importance of this ideal in a democracy and specifically in the 
public schools. Also, the same historical facts and interrelationship 
between a state and its people and a state and the national government 
were quoted by different Justices to support varying views on the meaning 
and purpose of the Amendments. The Justices of the Supreme Court involved 
in the cases discussed and the lay persons interpreting the decisions 
seemed to disagree as to when a state passed beyond the "verge of power" 
constitutionally given to them. 
It may be concluded that the Plessy v. Ferguson decision retarded 
the establishment of equal education for all. The 1954 case of Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka reversed the Plessy v. Ferguson decision 
and declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional. Desegre-
gation was to be brought about with all deliberate speed. However, the 
interpretation of "with all deliberate speed" has not been the same in 
the various states. It now appears that a more vigorous effort is being 
made to enforce the supreme law of the land. 
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The purpose of this study was to (1) examine the United States 
Supreme Court cases of 1896 and 1954-55 dealing with the integration-
segregation problem in public schools; (2) analyze the opinions of the 
different justices on the cases; (3) consider the interpretations of 
the decisions of the Court by various authorities; and (4) determine 
the implications of these decisions. 
The procedures used in making this study were (1) an examination 
of the texts of the selected cases and (2) a survey of the literature 
available in the Kansas State University Library concerning the problem 
of integration-segregation in public schools with special emphasis on 
the selected cases. 
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 347 US (1896), the Supreme Court ruled 
that separate but equal facilities in education were constitutional. 
Justice Brown, spokesman for the majority of the Supreme Court, stated 
that it was within the police power of a state to require separate 
facilities for different races. This was not a violation of the Thirteenth 
or Fourteenth Amendment. However, the state must use its police power 
"reasonably". 
Justice Harlan dissented. He felt that the requirement to separate 
races in transportation and education was a violation of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional. It was a 
violation of basic rights guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution 
regardless of race. 
Not all lay persons agreed with the ruling and interpretation 
handed down by the Supreme Court. Some people felt that the Court had 
grossly misinterpreted the meaning of the Constitution. 
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In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 354 US (1954), the 
Supreme Court reversed its previous interpretation of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court declared the separate but equal 
doctrine of the Plessy case unconstitutional. Justice Warren, spokesman 
for the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, declared the separation 
of races in education as being in violation with the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Segregation of children in 
public schools deprived children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities. It also deprived them of the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Some lay persons agreed with the Court's decision and called for 
the abolishment of segregation in theaters, lunchcounters, housing, and 
churches. Other persons were of the opinion that the Court had falsely 
interpreted the meaning of the Constitution. No person denied the importance 
of "equality of opportunity". The difference came with the various inter-
pretations of this "equality of opportunity". 
There was much variation in the degree and speed of compliance 
by the different states with the Court's ruling. In 1963, nine years 
after the decision was handed down, Alabama still operated its 114 school 
districts on a segregated basis. On the other hand, Delaware, which had 
eighteen of 106 school districts desegregated in 1957, had all of its 
school districts desegregated by 1963. 
Today equality is still only good on paper in many places in the 
United States. A more vigorous enforcement of the supreme law of the 
land must occur before equality becomes a reality in all parts of the 
United States. 
